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C
 
lassical Sunn
 
i
 
 eschatology maintains that all those who believe that God 
is one will enter the Garden of Paradise in due time. Some monotheists 
may first have to endure punishment and purification in the Fire for 
their sins, but those with even the least grain of belief will eventually enter the 
Garden as their reward. Conversely, unbelievers and those who associate 
partners with God (
 
mushrik
 
u
 
n
 
) will spend eternity in Hell-Fire as retribution 
for their unforgivable error.
 
1
 
 Classical Sunnism supports punishment of 
unbelievers and associators in unending Fire with many verses from the 
Qur
 
’a
 
n. However, its fundamental warrant for this doctrine is not the Qur
 
’a
 
n 
but consensus (
 
ijm
 
a“
 
). The classical Sunn
 
i
 
 principle of consensus affirms that 
when the scholars of the Muslim community have agreed on a matter — that 
Islam has Five Pillars, for example — it is no longer open to discussion.
 
2
 
 So, 
the claim here is that the Muslim community has reached a binding consensus 
that punishment of unbelievers in the Fire will never cease.
 
3
 
This claim has not gone uncontested. In copious writings on the duration 
of the Fire, the Damascene theologian Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) 
— the leading student of the famed 
 
H
 
anbal
 
i
 
 jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) 
— presents what may well be the most forthright challenge to the alleged 
consensus on this doctrine in medieval Islamic thought. The case for the 
limited duration of chastisement in the Fire did receive careful consideration 
earlier on as is evident in the vast Qur
 
’a
 
n commentary of Fakhr al-D
 
i
 
n al-R
 
a
 
z
 
i
 
 
(d. 606/1209).
 
4
 
 Nonetheless, Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussions appear to be 
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unprecedented in their thoroughness and length. In his argumentation, the Fire 
no longer functions retributively to punish as in the classical doctrine but 
therapeutically to cleanse from sins, even the sins of unbelief (
 
kufr
 
) and 
associationism (
 
shirk
 
). Does then the punishment of unbelievers come to an 
end? Does the Fire pass away when its purposes have been attained? As we 
will see, some scholars have concluded that Ibn al-Qayyim answers these 
questions affirmatively to yield a doctrine of universal salvation. Yet, closer 
examination of his texts shows that coming to this conclusion is not as simple 
as it first appears.
This article investigates three lengthy discussions on the duration of 
punishment and the Fire by Ibn al-Qayyim that come from the later years 
of his life. These three have emerged in recent controversial literature as the 
fullest and most significant of Ibn al-Qayyim’s deliberations on the topic.
 
5
 
 
I have not undertaken an exhaustive search for additional treatments 
elsewhere in Ibn al-Qayyim’s vast corpus, and no attempt is made here to 
provide a comprehensive overview of his thought on this subject. Rather, 
this study seeks to clarify Ibn al-Qayyim’s views in the key texts under 
consideration, note debts to his teacher Ibn Taymiyya, and explore the means 
by which he circumvents the classical Sunn
 
i
 
 consensus.
 
The Beginnings of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Deliberations
 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya reveals how he first broached the question 
of everlasting chastisement with Ibn Taymiyya in an autobiographical note 
found in his 
 
Shif
 
a”
 
 al-
 
“
 
al
 
i
 
l
 
 (
 
Healing of the Sick
 
) [hereafter 
 
Shif
 
a”
 
]:
 
6
 
I had asked Shaykh al-Islam [Ibn Taymiyya] — God sanctify his spirit — 
[about everlasting chastisement]. He said to me, “This issue is very 
great”, and he gave no reply concerning it. Some time had passed after 
that when I saw in the commentary of 
 
‘
 
Abd b. 
 
H
 
am
 
i
 
d [or 
 
Hu
 
mayd] 
al-Kithth
 
i
 
 one of those traditions I have mentioned. So, I sent the book 
to [Ibn Taymiyya] while he was in his last session (
 
f
 
i
 
 majlisihi al-akh
 
i
 
r
 
). 
I marked that place [in the book], and I told the messenger, “Say to him, 
‘This place is difficult for him, and he does not know what it is.” Then, 
he wrote his famous work about it — the mercy of God be upon him. 
Whoever has the grace of knowledge, let him bring it forth, and above 
each one having knowledge is one who is All-Knowing (pp. 564–65).
 
It appears that Ibn Taymiyya was not sure how to respond to Ibn 
al-Qayyim’s first inquiry on the duration of the Fire. He only answered that the 
question was “very great.” Ibn al-Qayyim’s second inquiry was prompted by 
reading the commentary of 
 
‘
 
Abd b. 
 
H
 
am
 
i
 
d al-Kiss
 
i
 
 (or al-Kithth
 
i
 
 as he writes), 
a ninth-century Hadith scholar from Kiss near Samarqand (d. 249/863).
 
7
 
 
A tradition related by 
 
‘
 
Abd b. 
 
H
 
am
 
i
 
d puzzled Ibn al-Qayyim. So, he marked 
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slamic 
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the spot in the book and sent it to his teacher via messenger. This occurred 
“while [Ibn Taymiyya] was in his last session,” presumably near the end of his 
life. In reply Ibn Taymiyya composed what Ibn al-Qayyim calls his “famous 
work.” The identity of this work and its date will be clarified below.
In the passage above Ibn al-Qayyim also alludes to having mentioned the 
puzzling tradition from 
 
‘
 
Abd b. 
 
H
 
am
 
i
 
d earlier in 
 
Shif
 
a”. A few pages back, 
he does indeed cite from ‘Abd b. Hamid the following report from ‘Umar b. 
al-Kha††ab, a Companion of the Prophet and the second Sunni caliph: “Even if 
the People of the Fire stayed in the Fire like the amount of sand of ‘Alij, they 
would have, despite that, a day in which they would come out” (p. 554). The 
place name ‘Alij refers to a large tract of sand in the desert on the way to 
Mecca,8 and the simile “like the amount of sand of ‘Alij” in ‘Umar’s report 
indicates a very great length of time. Thus, the sense is that those in the Fire 
will leave it someday even if they remain therein for a very long time.
At the same place in Shifa”, Ibn al-Qayyim cites other reports that also cast 
doubt on the eternity of punishment in Hell-Fire. Two examples will suffice. 
A report from the Prophet’s Companion Abu Hurayra conveys a message 
similar to that of ‘Umar: “There will come to Hell a day when no one will 
remain in it.” The second example counsels withholding judgment about 
where humans will end up. The Companion Ibn ‘Abbas is reported to have 
said, “It is not necessary for anyone to judge God with respect to His creatures 
or to assign them to a garden or a fire” (p. 554). Ibn al-Qayyim clearly 
understands these sundry reports to undermine the classical Sunni consensus 
that unbelievers and associators will spend eternity in the Fire. But where 
exactly does that lead him?
Ibn al-Qayyim’s Debt to Ibn Taymiyya’s Fana] al-nar
Ibn al-Qayyim’s most frequently cited treatment of the Fire’s duration 
appears in his book on eschatology Hadi al-arwah ila bilad al-afrah 
(Spurring Souls on to the Realms of Joys) [hereafter Hadi].9 A marking on one 
manuscript of Hadi dates it to 745/1344–45 with the text, “He [i.e., Ibn al-
Qayyim] completed its composition in the year 745 A.H.”10 I have no reason to 
doubt this date, but it would be good to have corroborating evidence before 
accepting it as established. Some 400 years later, the Yemeni scholar 
Muhammad b. Isma‘il al-San‘ani (d. 1182/1768) quotes Hadi at length in his 
refutation Raf “ al-astar and charges both Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyya 
with maintaining that Hell-Fire will pass away ( fana” al-nar).11 Despite 
al-San‘ani’s assertions, it has not been obvious what can be rightly learned 
about Ibn Taymiyya from the discussion in Hadi. At a few points toward 
the beginning, Ibn al-Qayyim does indicate that he is quoting Ibn Taymiyya. 
Unfortunately, however, he does not demarcate Ibn Taymiyya’s words from his 
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own, indicate the text that he is citing, or make clear which view his teacher 
took. To make matters more difficult, modern scholars have been hard pressed 
to find Ibn Taymiyya speaking about the duration of the Fire anywhere in his 
own texts. On this basis, Saudi scholar ‘Ali al-Harbi even concluded in 1990 
that Ibn Taymiyya never said that the Fire will pass away.12
Nevertheless, Binyamin Abrahamov came to the opposite conclusion in a 
2002 article entitled “The Creation and Duration of Paradise and Hell in Islamic 
Theology.” Abrahamov argues that both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya maintain that the Fire will pass away. With respect to Ibn 
al-Qayyim, Abrahamov draws this inference from Hadi, but for Ibn Taymiyya 
he does not refer to any of his writings or mention how hard it has been to 
find him speaking to this issue. Abrahamov’s sole source for Ibn Taymiyya is 
al-San‘ani.13
Fortunately, the key to solving the mystery of Ibn al-Qayyim’s quotations 
from Ibn Taymiyya and the latter’s own view is now available. In 1995 
Muhammad al-Simhari edited and published a treatise by Ibn Taymiyya and 
gave it the title Al-Radd “ala man qala bi-fana” al-janna wa al-nar (Response 
to Whoever Says that the Garden and the Fire Will Pass Away). I will 
call it Fana” al-nar for short. As the editor al-Simhari argues, this brief work is 
undoubtedly authentic.14 This is the text that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya quotes in 
Hadi, and it conspicuously shapes the structure of his discussion in that book. 
As will become clear below, Ibn al-Qayyim proceeds through the same topics 
and arguments in the same order as Ibn Taymiyya but with extensive 
elaboration and addition. Ibn Taymiyya’s text structures Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
discussion in Shifa” as well, but to a lesser degree.
Ibn Taymiyya’s Fana” al-nar gains added significance in view of Ibn al-
Qayyim’s autobiographical note in Shifa” quoted above. There, Ibn al-Qayyim 
comments that he sent his question about ‘Abd b. Hamid’s book to Ibn 
Taymiyya during “his last session” and that his teacher responded with 
“his famous work.” There is little reason to doubt that this “famous work” is 
Fana” al-nar. Ibn Taymiyya’s text gives careful attention to ‘Abd b. Hamid’s 
commentary and the report from ‘Umar that troubled Ibn al-Qayyim. Moreover, 
mention of Ibn Taymiyya being in his “last session” strongly suggests that he 
was near life’s end. This is corroborated by references which Caterina Bori has 
identified showing Fana” al-nar to be the last treatise that Ibn Taymiyya 
authored.15 In a long list of Ibn Taymiyya’s works, his disciple Ibn Rushayyiq 
(d. 749/1348–49) observes, “In his final imprisonment, he produced Qa“ida fi 
radd “ala man qala bi-fana” al-janna wa al-nar, in about 20 sheets.”16 Adding 
more information, the biographer al-Safadi (d. 764/1363) states concerning Ibn 
Taymiyya’s Fi baqa” al-janna wa al-nar wa fana”ihima, “This is the last thing 
that he compiled in the citadel, and al-‘Allama Qadi al-Qudah Taqi al-Din 
Islamic Universalism
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al-Subki has refuted it.”17 Taqi al-Din al-Subki did in fact write a refutation of 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Fana” al-nar in 1348, and this will be discussed below. More 
to the point, it is evident that al-Safadi’s and Ibn Rushayyiq’s notices refer to 
the same treatise, namely Fana” al-nar, and that this was the last work that 
Ibn Taymiyya wrote during his final imprisonment in the citadel of Damascus. 
This incarceration began in 726/1326. Ibn Taymiyya’s pen and paper were 
confiscated in Jumada al-akhira 728/April–May 1328,18 and he died in prison 
later the same year.
From these observations we may conclude that Ibn Taymiyya wrote his last 
work Fana” al-nar in response to an inquiry from Ibn al-Qayyim about the 
duration of punishment and the Fire. This occurred during Ibn Taymiyya’s final 
imprisonment, just before he was deprived of his writing materials in the 
spring of 728/1328. Ibn al-Qayyim then followed his teacher’s treatise very 
closely several years later, perhaps in 745/1344–45, when composing his 
discussion of the Fire’s duration in Hadi and more loosely when writing on 
the same topic in Shifa”.
Salafi and Theological Arguments in Fana] al-nar 
and Hadi
Ibn Taymiyya’s Fana” al-nar (p. 41) and Ibn al-Qayyim’s corresponding 
discussion in Hadi (p. 307) both begin by outlining three possible views on 
the durations of the Garden and the Fire: 1) both pass away, 2) both remain 
forever, or 3) the Garden remains forever while the Fire passes away. The first 
of these views is refuted in the first section of Fana” al-nar. The second view 
is refuted in the third section. The third view is defended in both the second 
and fourth sections. The discussion in Ibn al-Qayyim’s Hadi follows suit. The 
fifth and final section in Ibn Taymiyya’s Fana” al-nar cites Qur’anic verses 
showing that the Garden will remain forever (pp. 83–87). Ibn al-Qayyim does 
not go on to treat this matter because he has already attended to it earlier in 
Hadi (pp. 305–7) just before picking up with Fana” al-nar.
The first section of Fana” al-nar (pp. 42–52) and the parallel discussion 
in Hadi (pp. 307–11) are devoted to refuting the views of Jahm b. Safwan 
(d. 128/745) and the early Mu‘tazili theologian Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allah 
(227/841?). Jahm argues that the impossibility of an infinite series means that 
both the Garden and the Fire must eventually cease to exist. On a similar basis, 
Abu al-Hudhayl argues not that the two will pass away entirely but that motion 
in them must end. Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim respond that an infinite 
series into the future is possible and that Jahm ignores Qur’anic texts indicating 
the perpetuity of the Garden. These verses include, “Its food is perpetual” 
(Q. 13:35), and, “Truly, this is Our provision which is never exhausted” 
(Q. 38:54).
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The second section of Fana” al-nar explores textual support for the Fire 
passing away or at least that no one will suffer chastisement in it forever 
(pp. 52–70). Ibn al-Qayyim’s matching section in Hadi (pp. 311–18) quotes 
much of Ibn Taymiyya’s content and elaborates similar points. Ibn Taymiyya 
begins with ‘Umar’s report cited by ‘Abd b. Hamid, “Even if the People of the 
Fire stayed in the Fire like the amount of sand of ‘Alij, they would have, despite 
that, a day in which they would come out.” ‘Abd b. Hamid cites this report, 
explains Ibn Taymiyya, when interpreting the Qur’anic testimony that the 
residents of Hell will be “staying in it for long stretches of time (labithina fiha 
ahqaban)” (Q. 78:23) to show that “long stretches of time” does indeed have 
an end. Ibn Taymiyya also quotes several early exegetical traditions that take 
“long stretches of time (ahqab)” to mean a period of finite length. To reconcile 
this with classical Sunni doctrine, it might be argued that the verse applies only 
to monotheistic sinners and the time they spend in the Fire before entering the 
Garden.19 Ibn Taymiyya asserts that this is not so. The verse definitely refers 
to unbelievers.
Among other points that Ibn Taymiyya makes in this section is that several 
commentators use Ibn ‘Abbas’s report, “It is not necessary for anyone to judge 
God with respect to His creatures or to assign them to a garden or a fire,” to 
explicate the Qur’anic claim that the residents of the Fire will be “abiding in 
the Fire, as long as the Heavens and the Earth endure, except as your Lord 
wills” (Q. 11:107). Time spent in the Fire is not everlasting absolutely. Rather, 
Ibn Taymiyya observes, it is contingent upon both the existence of this world 
and — as corroborated by Ibn ‘Abbas — God’s will.
The third section of Ibn Taymiyya’s Fana” al-nar (pp. 71–79) and the 
roughly equivalent section in Ibn al-Qayyim’s Hadi (pp. 318–22) list and refute 
arguments for the perpetuity (dawam) of the Fire. Only the first two of these 
need occupy us here, and the second will be treated first because it is quickly 
explained. This is the argument that the Qur’an supports the perpetuity of the 
Fire. In reply, Ibn Taymiyya recognizes that the Qur’an says that unbelievers 
are “abiding in [the Fire] forever (khalidun fiha abadan)” (Q. 4:169, 33:65, 
etc.). Yet, he avers, the Qur’an never states that the Fire will not pass away. 
There would seem to be a contradiction here. If unbelievers abide in the Fire 
forever, how could the Fire pass away? Ibn Taymiyya responds that the 
residents of Hell will abide in the abode of chastisement only as long as that 
chastisement lasts. The terms “abiding” (khalid ) and “forever” (abad ) should 
not be understood in absolute and unqualified senses. This is the same 
solution to textual difficulties that Ibn Taymiyya employed in the preceding 
section of Fana” al-nar.
The first and more significant argument for the perpetuity of the Fire 
is that it is held by consensus (ijma“ ), with no conflict over it found among 
Islamic Universalism
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the Salaf (i.e., the early Muslims). Ibn Taymiyya responds that no consensus 
on this question is known. No one among the Prophet’s Companions said 
that the Fire would never pass away, and the Successors (tabi “un), 
the second generation after the Prophet, held diverse views on the matter. 
Thus, Ibn Taymiyya argues, there is no ijma“ or consensus that the Fire will 
remain forever.
This way of conceiving consensus divides Ibn Taymiyya methodologically 
from the mainstream Sunni scholars of his day, and it is the key to his and Ibn 
al-Qayyim’s Salafi hermeneutic. For Ibn Taymiyya, the only binding consensus 
is an explicit consensus of the Salaf, the first three generations at most. 
Thereafter, consensus becomes too difficult to verify. Any consensus by a later 
generation of scholars is always subject to correction upon discovery of a 
stronger proof.20 Thus, when Ibn Taymiyya discovers that there was no 
agreement among the Salaf on the duration of the Fire, he is willing to rethink 
the issue. In classical Sunnism, however, matters on which consensus have 
been reached are no longer open to discussion. So, by virtue of raising this 
question anew, Ibn Taymiyya is breaking the rules of classical Sunni 
hermeneutics.
This becomes clearer in Taqi al-Din al-Subki’s (d. 756/1355) Al-I“tibar, a 
refutation of Fana” al-nar written in 1348, twenty years after Ibn Taymiyya’s 
death.21 Although al-Subki devotes much space to quoting Qur’anic verses 
supporting the eternity of the Fire, he writes at the very beginning of the 
treatise, “The doctrine of the Muslims is that the Garden and the Fire will 
not pass away. Abu Muhammad b. Hazm has transmitted that this is held 
by consensus and that whoever opposes it is an unbeliever by consensus” 
(p. 32). That is, to suggest that the Fire is not eternal is to fall directly into 
unbelief. Al-Subki reiterates this elsewhere in the treatise although he is careful 
to clarify that he does not label any particular person an unbeliever 
(pp. 47, 85, 89).
Even more telling is how al-Subki responds to Ibn Taymiyya’s charge that 
there was no consensus among the Salaf. Al-Subki first expresses disbelief that 
anyone among the Salaf ever said that the Fire would pass away. But then he 
explains that some statements of the Salaf should not be taken literally. They 
require reinterpretation (ta”wil ), just as some verses in the Qur’an and reports 
in the Hadith require reinterpretation. This is especially so in matters of 
doctrine upon which Muslims are agreed (p. 59). Al-Subki later explains that 
consensus might legitimately be undermined by “transmission of a clear 
difference (naql khilaf sarih).” However, he denies that this has occurred on 
this issue, and he then effectively negates the possibility of a “clear difference” 
ever emerging by arguing that the reports of the Salaf to which Ibn Taymiyya 
appeals should be reinterpreted so as “to give a favorable opinion of them 
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[i.e., the Salaf ] (tahsinan li-l-zann bihim)” (p. 79). For al-Subki, the classical 
scholarly consensus is binding and earlier testimony must be read charitably 
in its light.
Al-Subki’s argument from consensus is still invoked today. In a 1986 book 
on Paradise and the Fire, Sulayman al-Ashqar likewise cites Ibn Hazm’s 
assertion of consensus that the Fire will not pass away, and he maintains that 
this is “the doctrine of the People of the Sunna and the Community.”22 
Al-Ashqar observes that Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim are wrong on this 
doctrine but should not be censured as unbelievers. They were engaged in 
creative reasoning from authoritative texts (ijtihad ) and will be rewarded 
accordingly. If they had been properly informed of the truth, they would have 
changed to the correct view. Moreover, al-Ashqar explains, early scholars 
(i.e., Salaf) similarly held views that sometimes disagreed with what eventually 
became the consensus of the Muslim community. Imam Malik (d. 179/795), 
for example, maintained that the invocation “In the name of God, the Merciful, 
the All-Merciful” found at the head of Qur’anic suras was not part of the 
Qur’an whereas consensus was later reached that it was. Also, ‘Umar b. 
al-Kha††ab said that a traveler who could not find water did not have to pray 
whereas it was agreed in due course that a traveler in such circumstances 
should pray after performing ritual cleansing with sand.23 Although al-Ashqar 
does not make the point explicitly, it is clear that he grants a later scholarly 
consensus precedence over diversity of views among the Salaf. Ibn Taymiyya’s 
Salafi methodology turns the tables on this strategy by making diversity among 
the Salaf grounds for scrutinizing and reconsidering doctrines prevailing 
among later scholars. One such doctrine that falls under Ibn Taymiyya’s ax, 
obviously, is the eternity of the Fire, and in this he is followed faithfully by Ibn 
al-Qayyim.
The fourth section of Ibn Taymiyya’s Fana” al-nar (pp. 80–83) and the 
much longer parallel section in Ibn al-Qayyim’s Hadi (pp. 322–41) are cast as 
a series of differences between the Garden and the Fire. In reality, they 
constitute arguments for the perpetuity of the Garden and the limited duration 
of the Fire and chastisement in it. Ibn Taymiyya provides eight arguments. The 
first five reiterate textual indications for limited duration of the Fire and need 
not be recounted here. The sixth through eighth are theological. The sixth 
argument explains that God’s mercy (rahma) and forgiveness entail the 
blessing of the Garden. The Garden remains forever as something following 
necessarily from God’s attributes and names, especially God’s forgiveness and 
mercy. Chastisement, however, may cease because it is only something 
created. It does not follow necessarily from God’s names. This of course does 
not yet prove definitively that chastisement in the Fire will pass away. For that 
something more is needed, and this is provided in the seventh argument, 
Islamic Universalism
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where Ibn Taymiyya makes his key theological move. He observes that God’s 
mercy encompasses all things. The Qur’an says, “[God] has written mercy for 
Himself” (Q. 6:12), and, in the Hadith, we find, “My mercy precedes my 
anger,”24 and, “My mercy overcomes my anger.”25 So, Ibn Taymiyya reasons, 
God’s mercy precludes chastisement without end. In the eighth argument, 
Ibn Taymiyya asserts that God has a wise purpose (hikma) in everything that 
He does. As he cannot imagine God having any wise purpose in creating 
everlasting chastisement, chastisement is limited, and its wise purpose is 
cleansing from sins and purifying souls.
That Ibn Taymiyya should even consider what reason or purpose God 
might have in everlasting chastisement sets him at odds with the dominant 
Ash‘ari theology of his day. In classical Ash‘arism, God does not act for reasons 
or purposes. The only explanation for what God does is that God wills it. 
As I have shown elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya refutes the arguments that support 
this Ash‘ari voluntarism and maintains that God creates everything for wise 
purposes — evils and all human actions included — such that this is the best 
possible world. On those few occasions when Ibn Taymiyya is specific about 
God’s wise purposes in evil, he speaks of the lessons that Pharaoh’s rebellion 
and destruction teach us, the humility nurtured by illness and sins, and the 
expiation of sin gained through suffering. Evil is educational and purifying. 
It affords opportunity to struggle and advance in the religious life and perfect 
worship of God alone.26 Probably more than any other factor, this theological 
optimism spurs Ibn Taymiyya to reconsider the received doctrine that the Fire 
is eternal. Reports from the likes of ‘Umar and Ibn ‘Abbas noted above and the 
Salafi hermeneutic that allows reading them afresh certainly play their parts, 
but, more fundamentally, everlasting Fire undermines Ibn Taymiyya’s vision of 
a God who wisely creates all creatures and draws them to love and worship 
only Him.
This optimism comes into full flower with a strongly therapeutic hue in the 
much more extensive parallel section of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Hadi. Ibn al-Qayyim 
rejects the Ash‘ari notion that God creates some people from the outset to 
languish eternally in the Fire. He clarifies that God does not create anyone 
to be an unbeliever essentially. There is no such thing as unbelief and 
associationism that cannot be removed, and no one is beyond the pale of 
being made fit for the Garden. God created everyone with a natural 
constitution ( fi†ra) to love God and confess His unity, and God’s wise purpose 
in chastisement is not vengeance but cleansing (pp. 324–26). The punishment 
of the Fire is not fundamentally a matter of retribution but therapy. Ibn 
al-Qayyim writes, “Trial and punishment are the remedies appointed to 
remove maladies. They are not removed by any other means. And the Fire 
is the Great Remedy” (p. 332). At another point, he says:
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The wise purpose [of God] — Glory be to Him — required that He make 
a remedy (dawa” ) appropriate to each malady (da” ) and that the 
remedy for the malady be among the most toilsome of remedies. The 
Compassionate Physician cauterizes one who is ill with the Fire, 
cauterization after cauterization, to remove the vile matter besmirching 
the upright nature (p. 326).27
Ultimately, argues Ibn al-Qayyim in Hadi, there can be no benefit or 
profit in everlasting punishment for anyone. It would be of no profit to 
God because God is above gaining anything from punishing human beings. 
At the human level, eternal punishment of the wretched does not increase the 
blessedness of God’s beloved, and it certainly is of no benefit to those who 
suffer under it. Punishment and chastisement can only be a means to a greater 
end (p. 327).
Similar to Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim also explains in Hadi that the 
Garden is a necessary product of God’s mercy and likewise the Fire a product 
of God’s anger (ghadab). Now, since we know that God’s mercy will 
overcome God’s anger, it follows that the effects of God’s mercy will overcome 
the effects of God’s anger (pp. 323–24, 333). Moreover, Ibn al-Qayyim 
clarifies, God’s good pleasure and mercy are essential attributes having no limit 
while God’s anger and wrath are not essential and thus do not need to last 
forever (p. 327). Ultimately, there is no good reason for evils like the Fire not 
to end. Ibn al-Qayyim states, “It is not in the divine wise purpose that evils 
remain perpetually without end and without interruption forever such that 
[evils] and goods would be equivalent in this” (p. 341).
To review: Ibn Taymiyya never states categorically in Fana” al-nar that the 
Fire and its chastisement will pass away. However, this is certainly the burden 
of his argument, and it is not without reason that later critics attribute this view 
to him. Ibn Taymiyya breaks with the classical Sunni consensus that the Fire 
is eternal by appealing to diversity among the Salaf. He interprets sayings of 
the Companions and early exegetical traditions on key Qur’anic texts to 
support the Fire’s passing away, and he employs theological arguments from 
God’s mercy and wise purpose to render the Fire’s end inevitable. Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya employs the same Salafi hermeneutic and follows Ibn Taymiyya’s 
exegesis and argumentation very closely in Hadi, often elaborating on his 
teacher. Elaboration is most evident as Ibn al-Qayyim develops his therapeutic 
rationale for the Fire and its eventual passing. The mercy and wise purpose 
of God work everything to the benefit of all, and retribution fades far from 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s horizon.
Yet, at the very end of his disquisition in Hadi and after explaining that he 
has finished presenting arguments for both sides of the issue, Ibn al-Qayyim 
raises the question of where he himself stands. In reply, he quotes, “Surely 
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your Lord does whatever He wills” (Q. 11:107), and he observes that this was 
the position of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, the Prophet’s Muhammad’s cousin and 
son-in-law. This final comment is so short that it is understandable that 
Abrahamov and others have not picked up on the agnosticism that it 
expresses.28 Yet, it does prevent concluding unreservedly from Hadi that 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya believes that the Fire will pass away. Moreover, 
Ibn al-Qayyim spells out this agnosticism on the duration of chastisement 
in the Fire more clearly in another text, his Shifa”.
Salafi Agnosticism in Shifa]
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s Shifa” is a large tome on divine determination 
(qadar), human agency and theodicy. Following in the footsteps of Ibn 
Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim elaborates a theodicy of optimism in which God 
creates everything in the best possible way for wise purposes. Pure evil does 
not exist. Evil that exists is evil relative only to those who suffer under it, 
but it is good in God’s overarching wise purpose. In the course of Shifa”, Ibn 
al-Qayyim addresses numerous problems of evil, one of which is everlasting 
Fire. As Ibn al-Qayyim puts the question, “What pleasure or good ensues from 
severe chastisement that does not break off or abate?” (p. 540, Ch. 22, part way 
into Aspect 36).
Ibn al-Qayyim’s answer in Shifa” first discusses the natural constitution 
( fi†ra) of the human being, how God’s mercy overtakes His anger, and textual 
evidence that chastisement in the Fire does not continue forever (pp. 544–57). 
Then follow a refutation of proofs for the perpetuity of the Fire (pp. 557–61) 
and an account of differences between the Garden and the Fire (pp. 561–64). 
The structural similarities of this treatment to Ibn al-Qayyim’s Hadi and Ibn 
Taymiyya’s Fana” al-nar are evident, but in Shifa” Ibn al-Qayyim reorders the 
material somewhat and writes with greater freedom. This suggests that Shifa” 
is later than Hadi. However, insufficient work has been done on a chronology 
of Ibn al-Qayyim’s texts to verify this independently. What we do know is that 
Shifa” is among Ibn al-Qayym’s later writings.29
The arguments in Shifa” are those of Hadi and need not be rehearsed here. 
However, Ibn al-Qayyim in Shifa” does inquire into what follows necessarily 
from God’s attributes in a sharper and more difficult way. As we saw above, 
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that mercy and good pleasure are essential attributes 
of God while anger and wrath are not. Thus, what follows necessarily from 
God’s anger, namely, the Fire, does not have to last forever. Now, what if 
chastisement is understood to follow not from God’s non-essential attribute of 
anger but necessarily from God’s justice (“adl ), might (“izza) and wise 
purpose? Would not chastisement then be everlasting because it follows from 
these essential attributes of God? Ibn al-Qayyim rejects this conclusion. Rather, 
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he argues, these attributes are fully operative even when chastisement has 
achieved its aims. It is not that God’s attributes of justice, might and wise 
purpose no longer function when chastisement ends. It is rather that God’s 
justice, might and wise purpose specify when chastisement is best brought to 
an end. Chastisement falls entirely within the scope of these attributes, which 
in turn come under the purview of God’s mercy. Here is how Ibn al-Qayyim 
puts it:
If it is said, “Chastisement emanates from His might, His wise purpose 
and His justice. These are beautiful names and attributes of perfection. 
What emanates from them is perpetual by virtue of their perpetuity,” it is 
said, “By God, chastisement indeed emanates from might, wise purpose 
and justice. The end [of chastisement], when what is intended is 
obtained, emanates from might, wise purpose and justice.30 
Chastisement and its interruption do not fall outside the sphere of His 
might, His wise purpose and His justice. However, when it ends, might 
is conjoined with mercy, and mercy is conjoined with liberality, 
beneficence, pardon and forgiveness. Might and wise purpose do not 
cease and do not decrease. On the contrary, everything that He created, 
that He creates, that He commanded and that He commands emanates 
from His might and His wise purpose” (p. 562).
Apart from this, the most significant new material in Shifa” comes at the 
end of Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussion. Here he relates his encounter with Ibn 
Taymiyya that produced the “famous work” Fana” al-nar — this passage 
was quoted above — and then he sets out his own view. As we have seen, 
Ibn al-Qayyim ends his treatment in Hadi by citing ‘Ali b. Abi Talib and 
very briefly leaving the duration of the Fire to God’s will. In Shifa”, he makes 
this agnosticism more explicit by quoting the sayings of several more 
of the Salaf:
In this issue I follow the statement of the Prince of the Believers 
‘Ali b. Abi Talib — God be pleased with him. He mentioned that the 
People of the Garden enter the Garden and the People of the Fire enter 
the Fire. He described that very well, and then he said, “After that, 
God does with His creatures what He wills.”
And [I] follow the doctrine of ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abbas — God be pleased 
with both of them — where he says, “It is not necessary for anyone to 
judge God with respect to His creatures or to assign them to a garden or 
a fire.” He mentioned this in his commentary on His statement, “He will 
say, ‘The Fire will be your dwelling place, dwelling in it forever, except 
as God wills” (Q. 6:128).
And [I] follow the doctrine of Abu Sa‘id al-Khudri where he says, 
“The whole Qur’an comes down to this verse: ‘Surely your Lord does 
whatever He wills” (Q. 11:107).
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And [I] follow the doctrine of Qatada where he says about His 
statement, “Except as your Lord wills” (Q. 11:107): “God is all-knowing 
about His clarification of what happens.”
And [I] follow the doctrine of Ibn Zayd where he says, “God has 
informed us what He wills for the People of the Garden. He said, 
‘A gift never cut off ’ (Q. 11:108). He did not inform us what He wills for 
the People of the Fire.”
The statement, “The Fire and its chastisement are perpetual by virtue 
of God’s perpetuity,” is a report about God concerning what He will do. 
If it does not correspond to what He reports about Himself concerning 
that, then it is speaking ill of Him without knowledge. And the 
authoritative texts do not lead us to understand that. God knows better 
(p. 565).
At the end of this passage from Shifa”, Ibn al-Qayyim renders theological 
arguments for the perpetuity of the Fire from God’s perpetuity void because 
they lack any foundation in authoritative texts. Yet, he also does not have 
a text from the Qur’an and the Hadith saying categorically that the Fire will 
pass away. To again quote Ibn Zayd: “[God] did not inform us what He wills 
for the People of the Fire.” Moreover, following Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim 
cannot find any consensus among the Salaf on the matter, and it goes without 
saying that the classical Sunni consensus on the Fire’s perpetuity is of no 
account to him.
What Ibn al-Qayyim does have are three things. First, he has reports from 
Companions of the Prophet like ‘Umar and Abu Hurayra indicating that 
everyone will eventually leave the Fire. Second, he has reports from ‘Ali, Ibn 
‘Abbas and others leaving the matter to God’s will. Third, he has powerful 
theological arguments from God’s mercy and wise purpose that the Fire will 
pass away. Ibn al-Qayyim could use his theological arguments to tilt the 
balance in favor of Companion reports that the Fire will pass away, but this he 
does not do. Instead, in Shifa”, as in Hadi, he leaves aside his theological 
arguments and takes his stand with the agnostic strand of reports coming from 
the Salaf: the duration of the Fire must be left to God’s inscrutable will. Yet, it 
appears that Ibn al-Qayyim is not entirely satisfied with this position. In a later 
work, he tips the balance in the other direction.
Salafi and Theological Universalism in Mukhtasar 
al-sawa[iq al-mursala
Ibn al-Qayyim’s Al-Sawa“iq al-mursala (The Thunderbolts Sent Out) is 
an extensive work of theology written after Hadi, which is mentioned in the 
text. It was the editor of Sawa“iq, Ali b. Muhammad al-Dakhil Allah, who 
discovered the note on a manuscript of Hadi dating it to 745/1344–45 that I 
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mentioned above. Thus, al-Dakhil Allah concludes, Sawa“iq must have been 
written after Hadi and after that date. However, Sawa“iq is not Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
final work before his death in 751/1350 because it is mentioned in turn in two 
later writings.31 Additionally, Joseph Bell surmises that Sawa“iq was written 
after Shifa”.32
The published version of Sawa“iq and the manuscripts upon which it is 
based contain only the first half of the work. The editor al-Dakhil Allah was 
unable to locate any manuscripts containing the second half. As the first half 
does not discuss the duration of the Fire, we only know that Ibn al-Qayyim 
treats this question in Sawa“iq by examining Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq al-mursala, 
an abridgement of the whole of Sawa“iq by Ibn al-Qayyim’s contemporary 
Muhammad b. al-Mawsili (d. 774/1372).33
The question that then presents itself is whether we may rely on 
Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq, itself a very large work, to convey an adequate sense 
of Ibn al-Qayyim’s original text and intention. The editors of both Sawa“iq 
and Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq compare the two to assess the character of Ibn 
al-Mawsili’s abridgment of the extant part of the former. Al-Dakhil Allah, as 
editor of four hefty volumes of Sawa“iq, is understandably alarmed at the great 
amount of interesting material excised in Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq, but he does 
not accuse Ibn al-Mawsili of compromising the text that remains or Ibn 
al-Qayyim’s overall argument.34 The editor of Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq, al-Hasan 
b. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Alawi, observes that al-Mawsili often drops or combines 
aspects of Ibn al-Qayyim’s arguments and sometimes eliminates entire sections 
but only rarely adds a note of his own or rearranges the order of the text.35 In 
short, we cannot know exactly how Ibn al-Mawsili abridged the material on 
the Fire in Sawa“iq, but, with this due qualification, Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq 
appears to provide sufficiently reliable access to the main lines of Ibn al-
Qayyim’s thought to warrant serious consideration. For the sake of economy, 
I will refer to Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq from here on as Ibn al-Qayyim’s work.
Ibn al-Qayyim discusses the Fire’s duration in Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq in the 
latter half of a long investigation on the problem of evil (pp. 544–690, 
following Aspect 53 of the second “Taghut”). His style here is much more fluid 
than in Hadi or Shifa”, and he is no longer dependent on Ibn Taymiyya’s Fana” 
al-nar to structure his argument. This corroborates evidence noted above that 
Sawa“iq is later than both Hadi and Shifa”.
Ibn al-Qayyim explains that God’s wise purpose in the creation of Iblis and 
other purveyors of evil is to make known the good from the bad and to bless 
believers by providing them opposition against which to strive in the way of 
God. It is objected, however, that this is of no benefit either to Iblis and his 
minions or to unbelievers who are consigned to merely instrumental roles in 
God’s economy (pp. 625–31). Ibn al-Qayyim responds to this objection in 
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twenty-two points. The first two points (pp. 631–41) and the last four 
(pp. 686–90) do not deal directly with the duration of the Fire and need not 
detain us here. The intervening sixteen points deploy the full range of 
arguments developed in Hadi and Shifa” against the eternity of the Fire and 
for its passing away to show that everyone will ultimately benefit from God’s 
ways with the world. Ibn al-Qayyim never says clearly that Iblis will enter the 
Garden, but this is implied (pp. 642–85).
Roughly speaking, Ibn al-Qayyim’s arguments in Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq 
proceed from the theological to the textual. The discussion begins with the 
long third point affirming that God’s mercy will prevail over all (pp. 642–63). 
The alleged consensus on the eternity of the Fire is not refuted until the 
seventeenth point (pp. 680–81). Along the way, Ibn al-Qayyim quotes the 
applicable sayings of the Salaf and interprets the requisite Qur’anic texts. He 
calls the Fire a whip that God created “to lead His servants to His mercy and 
His Garden” (p. 664), and he explains that the causes and aims of evil things 
will pass away and only that which is desired for the sake of God’s face will 
last forever (pp. 670–71). At the end of his tenth point, Ibn al-Qayyim sums 
up his fundamental theological argument:
These points and others make evident that the wise purpose 
and benefit in the creation of the Fire require that it remain as long as 
the cause and the wise purpose for which it was created remain. 
When the cause ceases and the wise purpose has been achieved, 
the matter returns to the preceding, overcoming, encompassing mercy 
(p. 671).
A new argument in Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq that I have not found in 
Hadi or Shifa” brings out the unfairness of punishing unbelief with eternal Fire. 
It would go against God’s justice and blessing, Ibn al-Qayyim maintains, to 
consign someone to everlasting chastisement for unbelief and associationism 
that are of only limited duration.36 It might be objected that everlasting 
punishment is indeed fitting for someone who at least intends to continue in 
unbelief and associationism forever. Ibn al-Qayyim responds that this would 
benefit no one. Rather, he is confident that the pain of chastisement will 
achieve the desired result: “It is not in human nature to persist in these means 
[of unbelief ] and to prefer them after suffering harshly from them for a long 
time” (pp. 656–58, quote on 658).
In Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq, Ibn al-Qayyim also mentions the agnostic option 
on the duration of chastisement that he presented as his own view in Hadi and 
Shifa”. This time, however, it appears early in his discussion, at the end of his 
third point on God’s mercy. Here, Ibn al-Qayyim does not himself consign the 
matter to God’s will. Rather, he chides those who do not follow his theological 
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and rational arguments to their logical conclusions, and he coaxes and even 
dares his reader to believe firmly that all chastisement will come to an end. 
Agnosticism remains an option only for those who lack insight:
Those who say that the chastisement of unbelievers is a benefit to them 
and a mercy to them circle around this sense and do not penetrate its 
depth. But what benefit to them is there in chastisement that does not 
end, that is perpetual by virtue of the perpetuity of the Lord — Most 
High is He?! Ponder this point very thoroughly, and give it its due 
reflection. Join that with the senses of His names and His attributes, with 
what His word and the word of His Messenger indicate, and with what 
the Companions and those after them said. Do not rush to speak without 
knowledge or to condemn. If the dawn of what is correct shines on you, 
[that is good]. If not, then ascribe the judgment to what God ascribes it 
in His statement, “Surely your Lord does whatever He wills” (Q. 11:107), 
and hold firm to the statement of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib — May God be 
pleased with him. He mentioned that the People of the Garden enter the 
Garden and the People of the Fire enter the Fire. He described their 
state. Then he said, “After that, God does what He wills” (p. 663).
To reiterate the challenge: Ibn al-Qayyim calls on his readers to bring 
together the theological arguments from God’s names and attributes, the 
evidence from revelation and the Salaf, and rational considerations of benefit 
to conclude that chastisement will indeed pass away. Only universal salvation 
could be of ultimate benefit to unbelievers. To those who cannot yet grasp 
this, Ibn al-Qayyim counsels leaving the matter to God’s will. It is evident that 
Ibn al-Qayyim has overcome his own apprehension and now believes that 
everlasting chastisement will definitely end and the Fire pass away. With this, 
he continues on in Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq, setting out fifteen more points in 
favor of this view.
Conclusion
In deliberating on the duration of Hell-Fire, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 
appropriates a Salafi hermeneutic and a body of Salafi interpretations from 
his teacher Ibn Taymiyya. For both scholars, the hermeneutic precludes 
granting authority to any consensus coming later than the first three Muslim 
generations. Only a consensus among the Salaf is binding. As this does not 
exist on the eternity of the Fire, the classical Sunni consensus on this matter is 
called into question. Moreover, some reports from the Companions of the 
Prophet indicate that chastisement in the Fire will end while other reports 
leave the question to God’s will.
Ibn al-Qayyim also adopts Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy of optimism. All things 
are ultimately good by virtue of God’s wise purpose, and God’s mercy will 
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prevail over all. The Fire is a great remedy that purifies and reforms even 
unbelievers and associators. Ibn al-Qayyim elaborates these arguments far 
more fully than does his master, but he hesitates in Hadi and Shifa” to adopt 
them unequivocally as his own. Instead, he leaves the duration of the Fire to 
God’s will, following various reports from the Salaf expressing agnosticism and 
leaving aside certain Companion reports indicating that chastisement in the 
Fire will end. In the later Mukhtasar al-sawa“iq al-mursala, Ibn al-Qayyim 
abandons his reserve and follows the theological argument from God’s mercy 
to its logical conclusion that chastisement will come to an end for all. The 
predominance of God’s mercy and the rationale of therapeutic restoration fully 
overtake the logic of retribution inherent in the doctrine of perpetual Fire.
Whether adopting an agnostic position on the duration of the Fire and 
the chastisement of unbelievers in it or arguing theologically for an Islamic 
universalism without reserve, Ibn al-Qayyim depends on his Salafi 
hermeneutic to bypass the deeply held classical consensus that the Fire will 
definitely remain forever. This is a courageous move, even as Ibn al-Qayyim 
obviously stands on Ibn Taymiyya’s shoulders. The Salafi approach to religious 
authority found little resonance in the Muslim society of Ibn al-Qayyim’s day 
and for centuries thereafter. Yet, it has been widely employed in the modern 
period, a period characterized by rationalism, displacement of traditional 
authority, and, for the religiously-minded, desire to return to the pristine 
original sources of the faith. For Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, as well as for modern 
Salafis, the Salaf offer an alternative source of authority with which to 
undermine classical Sunnism and its stewards. As we learn from Ibn 
al-Qayyim’s deliberations on the duration of the Fire, this can open up 
some intriguing avenues for theological reflection.
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